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Résumé Abstract 
Pendant les dernières décennies du XIXe siècle 
et les premières années du XXe, la mitrailleuse 
a été l'arme la plus mortelle et la plus dévas-
tatrice, mais cette caractéristique n'a pas pour 
autant garanti d'emblée son adoption par les 
institutions militaires traditionnelles. Dans 
Technology in Search of a Role, on examine la 
façon dont la mitrailleuse a finalement été inté-
grée aux armes des forces expéditionnaires 
canadiennes au cours de la Première Guerre 
mondiale, pour jouer certains rôles spécialisés 
qui dépendaient du poids et de la mobilité de 
chaque modèle; les mitrailleuses légères ont 
été adoptées par les petites unités d'infanterie, 
et les plus lourdes, par des corps d'armée créés 
expressément pour elles. 
Canadian military historians are a fractious 
and argumentative group, but on a few points 
they tend to agree, the country's lack of prepa-
ration in the years leading up to the First World 
War being one of them. There was, of course, 
no good reason for the young dominion to raise 
and equip a large army until the European 
Civil War actually broke out. Canada had far 
more important priorities in the early years of 
the century, especially nation-building, leaving 
few resources to what had to be considered a 
luxury. Thus, when Great Britain declared war 
on Germany on 4 August 1914 (which meant 
that Canada was also at war), it was necessary 
to mobilize an army from scratch; men were 
recruited, attested and concentrated at Valcartier, 
but that still left the problem of how to supply 
them with the tools of modern war — includ-
ing machine guns. 
Machine guns had proven themselves in 
many of the small wars Europeans had fought 
In the last decades of the 19th century and the 
opening years of the 20th, the machine gun 
proved to be a most lethal and devastating 
weapon, but this did not guarantee its large-scale 
adoption by traditional-minded military insti-
tutions. Technology in Search of a Role exam-
ines how the machine gun was eventually 
incorporated into the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force in the course of the First World War, play-
ing specialized roles depending on a particu-
lar gun's weight and mobility; light machine 
guns were adopted by small infantry units and 
heavier weapons were formed into a corps of 
their own. 
in the great scramble for colonies that charac-
terized the latter third of the 19th century 
(small wars for the Europeans, for Africans 
and Asians they were often nothing short of 
catastrophic). But this did not prove that the 
weapon would be useful against the large 
armies of industrialized countries. Racism 
played a part in military doctrine; European 
policy makers and staff officers insisted that 
just because machine guns had cut down Zulu 
impis or Dervish cavalry did not mean they 
would be effective against naturally "superior" 
white troops. Experience did little to dispel 
such views. British troops in the Boer War 
complained that the weapon suffered from 
mechanical failure, was too large and visible to 
the enemy, and was difficult to transport unless 
good roads were available — which was rare. 
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which 
around Port Arthur was characterized by 
siege-like conditions, demonstrated that, in 
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static positions, machine guns could be very 
effective against modern armies, but it would 
take far more than battles fought on distant 
continents to convince the British that they 
should adopt such weapons. Though in 1910 
Major N. M. McMahon suggested they be issued 
at the rate of one per company, or eight per bat-
talion, when the First World War broke out 
units only had two each.1 
The Canadian Militia took its doctrinal cue 
from the British, and only four machine guns 
were available at Valcartier for instructional pur-
poses.2 Certain individuals were more enthu-
siastic, however, among them Joe Boyle of the 
Yukon, who financed a machine-gun company. 
This "was joined by other units subscribed to 
by wealthy businessmen fascinated by the pos-
sibilities of this new weapon."3 These did not, 
however, become integrated into the 1st Cana-
dian Division that made its way to Britain, 
then France, in late-1914/early-1915, and the 
story of the motorized units is too lengthy — 
though interesting — to be recounted here. 
The focus of this study is how the Canadian 
contingent came to terms with the potential and 
problems posed by non-motorized infantry 
machine guns. 
When the formation made its way to the 
front lines in February 1915, its machine-gun 
organization had doubled in size, meaning that 
there were now two sections per battalion, 
totalling four guns, with an officer, two sergeants, 
a corporal, 24 privates, six drivers, and a bat-
man, for a total of 35 all ranks and 13 horses.4 
This may not appear to be very substantial, 
but with battalion strength established at 1 000, 
it represented a noticeable proportion of a unit's 
personnel. (A Canadian division was made up 
of three brigades, each of four battalions.) 
The Canadians' baptism of fire came in 
April 1915, when the Germans launched an 
offensive, using poison gas for the first time on 
the western front, aimed at eliminating a 
salient around the Belgian town of Ypres. On 
the 22nd and 23rd, thanks for the most part to 
chemical weapons, the Germans made sub-
stantial gains, forcing two French divisions on 
the Canadians' left to withdraw. The latter were 
called upon to counterattack, but the Germans 
used their machine guns to deadly effect. For 
example, on the 23rd, 
An attack by one company of the 2nd (East 
Ontario) Battalion against the German strong 
point in the southwest corner of Kitchener's 
Wood failed at dawn, when the ground mist 
suddenly lifted to reveal the advancing 
Canadians to a well-entrenched enemy 
200 yards away. Within seconds the German 
machine guns wiped out practically the entire 
company. Only fifteen survivors managed to 
crawl back to shelter in the 10th Battalion's 
trench.5 
Not only did the Germans defend their posi-
tions well, they also used machine guns in 
subsequent assaults against Canadian trenches. 
As Victor Odium, later to become a diplomat 
and divisional commander in the Second World 
War, related in a report, his troops managed to 
beat off three infantry assaults on the 24th. 
However, "Under cover of the last attack, the 
enemy had placed a machine gun on our left 
flank...and enfiladed the left part of trench 
with such a terrific fire, that I had to withdraw 
from it and the enemy occupied it a few min-
utes later."6 
Second Ypres ended as most battles did on 
the western front — in stalemate — and the 
Canadians, who had lost a third of their 18 000-
strong division, tried to glean what lessons 
they could from the carnage. One item to come 
under close scrutiny was the infamous Ross 
rifle, which had demonstrated an unfortunate 
tendency to jam when a soldier needed it most. 
Also criticized was the Colt machine gun 
(Fig. 1), which the Canadians used because 
the British could not provide them with the 
superior Vickers. One soldier, Private Donald 
Fraser of the 31st Battalion, simply referred to 
it as "a useless weapon," with many a draw-
back. "It was air cooled and heated up quickly. 
When a stoppage occurred, it had practically 
to be taken to pieces to have the stoppage 
rectified."7 Its complexity was evident in the 
348 spare parts and tools machine gun sec-
tions held to keep the four Colts of a battalion 
functional.8 
Fig. 1 
Colt machine gun. Note 
its high profile, 
especially in the open 
training area in which 
these men are 
rehearsing. (Courtesy 
National Archives of 
Canada, PA4915) 
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Complaints were sufficient to force an inves-
tigation, the headquarters of the 2nd Brigade, 
commanded by Arthur Currie, relating that, 
The reports received are almost unanimous in 
condemning the gun and I have reluctantly 
come to the conclusion that the weapon is 
from its complicated mechanism and cum-
bersome mounting unsuited for service con-
ditions and is liable to fail at critical moments 
when machine gun fire is essential to save the 
situation.9 
The 5th Battalion, to give just one example, 
reported that one gun, when fired, jammed, 
and the barrel had to be changed in the face of 
the enemy; another was out of action after only 
a few rounds were fired; a third was not used; 
and the fourth was abandoned, being too heavy 
for its crew to carry away in a withdrawal. The 
unit's commander warned that "It is impossi-
ble under present conditions to keep the mech-
anism of these guns free from sand and grit 
which in itself is one of the chief causes of 
stoppages."10 
The Colt suffered from three main faults: the 
tripod was too heavy and cumbersome to be 
moved easily; the extractor, which was sup-
posed to remove each spent casing so a new 
round could be inserted in the breech, failed 
often; and the mechanism was too exposed, 
allowing it to choke on sand and dirt. As Currie 
reported, "The most serious aspect of the case 
to my mind is that the men appear to have lost 
all confidence in the weapon, and I would 
most strongly urge for consideration the advis-
ability of rearming this Brigade with the British 
Service 'Maxim' Machine Gun,"11 manufac-
tured by Vickers. John Lundie, who eventually 
served with the 4th Machine Gun Battalion, 
agreed. In an interview 50 years later, he was 
asked to evaluate the Colt and the Vickers. 
"There was no comparison," as the former 
tended to "jam in the dust and stopped firing 
just at the moment when it was needed most." 
In short, "The Colt was a washout."12 
The gun was retained until Vickers replace-
ments became available, but other lessons of the 
first year of trench warfare were applied in the 
course of 1915. One was the need to increase 
the number of machine guns at the front in order 
to bolster defences. Three developments fol-
lowed: first, the Lewis gun, or light machine 
gun, was issued on an experimental basis at 
the rate of four per battalion in July; second, the 
heavy guns thus released (whether Colt or 
Vickers) were grouped together under the con-
trol of brigade headquarters; and finally, in 
October, establishments were increased so each 
battalion had eight Lewis guns and each brigade 
had 16 Vickers.13 The next step followed in 
early 1916 with the formation of machine gun 
companies to handle the latter; the 1st Cana-
dian Machine Gun Company was formed in 
January, with 15 more created by the end of 
1916. By then the Canadian Corps, as it came 
to be called, had four divisions under com-
mand, so each of these had four machine gun 
companies to support its operations. 
Another post-Ypres development was far 
more controversial. As described in a post-
war report by Captain (later Major-General) 
F. F. Worthington, a lifetime proponent of the 
machine gun, 
It was during this period that the terms of 
indirect fire began to show life. A considerable 
amount of experimenting took place followed 
by much adverse criticism from the infantry 
who no doubt had just cause for complaint. 
I dare say indeed there are of the infantry in 
those days and many to follow who did not 
suffer in some way from the over-zealousness 
of the machine gunners. The writer when in 
the infantry has a vivid recollection of a certain 
unpleasantness occurring from our machine 
guns firing into the front line.14 
An army is a society onto itself, and indirect 
fire on the part of machine guns might be 
viewed as a threat to one of the senior branches 
of that society — the artillery — so its propo-
nents faced challenges more than technical in 
nature. 
A less controversial lesson of the first year 
of war was the need to keep machine guns 
mobile so they could be placed where they 
would be needed most. To this end, the British 
developed intricate drills which choreographed 
every move by each member of the team. 
Though George Coppard, a machine gunner 
who later wrote about his experiences, described 
the Vickers as "the most successful...highly 
efficient, reliable, compact and reasonably 
light"15 gun; this was only in comparison with 
other types. In fact the gun weighed 28 pounds 
without its water jacket, while the tripod 
weighed 50, not equipment that could easily be 
maneuvered around a battlefield — especially 
one with bullets and shells flying about (Fig. 2). 
Each member of the team thus had to know his 
role in detail and be able to carry it out with-
out hesitation. When the weapon had to be 
moved, the number 1 carried the tripod and 
placed it where he wanted the gun to fire from. 
The number 2 placed the weapon on its mount, 
Material History Review 42 (Fall 1995) I Revue d'histoire de la culture matérielle 42 (automne 1995) 
89 
while the number 1 locked it into place. The 
number 3 carried 250 rounds of ammunition, 
handing it to the number 2 when needed, and 
the number 2 loaded it into the gun from one 
side while the number 1 pulled it through and 
ensured it was feeding properly, cocking the 
weapon at the same time. It was then ready for 
firing.16 Three other members of the six-man 
team were responsible for carrying extra ammu-
nition, the Vickers being able to fire 600 rounds 
a minute. 
Because heavy machine guns were grouped 
under the control of the brigade commander, 
the mainstay of battalion automatic fire was the 
Lewis (Fig. 3). Considerably lighter than the 
Vickers, various estimates placing its weight 
between 25 1/2 and 28 pounds (11.7 and 
12.7 kg), it fired not from belts but from a 
47-round magazine. One reason for its greater 
portability was the fact that it was air- rather 
than water-cooled, and that it was stabilized by 
a bipod much lighter than the tripod used for 
heavier guns. Operated by a crew of two (with 
four odiers to carry ammunition), one of whom 
carried extra magazines, it could only be fired 
in short bursts, as opposed to the streams of 
bullets that came out of the Vickers. In well-
trained hands, however, it could keep up almost 
the same rate of fire. One still had to beware of 
overheating, as the barrel could droop if it 
became too hot and maleable, and could even 
split open, rendering the weapon useless. It 
was, however, easy to maintain, and could be 
taken apart with only the nose of a bullet as a 
tool, most useful given the gun's exposure to 
dust, mud and other foreign matter.17 
Like any other technology, the Lewis was 
only as useful as its users were skillful, and 
Fig. 2 
Vickers machine gun. 
More reliable than the 
Colt, this photo clearly 
shows that it was not 
much more mobile, and 
had to be broken down 
into pieces to get it 
across no-man's-land. 
(Courtesy National 
Archives of Canada. 
PA635) 
Fig. 3 
Lewis light machine gun. 
Though there is no 
record of it having been 
used in the manner 
demonstrated, this photo 
shows its comparative 
lightness and ease of use. 
(Courtesy National 
Archives of Canada, 
PA69844) 
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Notes on Lewis Guns and Machine Guns 
reminded soldiers that "the mobility of a gun 
depends largely upon the mobility of its ammu-
nition,"18 and that gunners might well need 
carrying parties from the infantry units they 
were supporting. Such a logistical burden was 
justified, at least in the minds of commanders, 
by the advantages a machine gun conveyed. It 
could open a heavy and concentrated fire at a 
moment's notice, which it could maintain until 
two-thirds of the six-man crew had been killed 
or wounded. It offered maximum fire while 
taking up a minimum portion of front, each 
burst representing 20 to 30 rifles. 
In defensive positions, Lewis guns were 
best arranged in a "belt of fire" across the entire 
front, with overlapping arcs of aim. They did 
not point directly forward, but diagonally, in 
effect protecting their neighbours rather than 
themselves; this allowed them to cover more 
ground, and their fire was less likely to be seen. 
It also meant that enemy attacks would be 
enfiladed, waves of infantry coming under fire 
from the flanks. The gun's weight also allowed 
it to be used in an attack, its role was to cover 
the infantry advance by keeping down or 
unsteadying enemy fire; it could also delay the 
movement of enemy reinforcements by firing 
into communication trenches.19 
It was tested in trench raids and many small 
actions in the latter half of 1915 and through 
much of 1916, and the Canadians attempted to 
apply machine gun doctrine on a large scale in 
the Battle of the Somme. The campaign began 
on 1 July 1916, when the British assaulted 
German positions, and suffered horrific casu-
alties (about 59 000 in that single day), but 
the Canadians did not go into the line until 
September, by which time they had learned 
much from the fighting there. Their first major 
battle on the Somme was the assault on 
Courcelette on 15 September and subsequent 
days, and though the attack is best remem-
bered for the first use of tanks on any scale on 
the western front, it also demonstrated how 
machine guns were used at the half-way point of 
the war. 
The attack was carried out by the 2nd Divi-
sion's 5th Brigade, with 44 Vickers machine 
guns in support, divided into two groups, 
referred to simply as "left" and "right." On 
15 September, "at 12.40 pm the 3rd Can 
Division reported that the trench.. .was full of 
Germans and requested that the trench should 
be engaged by Machine Gun Fire. All guns of 
the left Group opened fire on this trench a few 
minutes afterwards and cleared the trench 
which was taken later without resistance."20 
The right group also had a role to play, engag-
ing enemy machine gun batteries on the 16th; 
the 5th Brigade's 25th Battalion reported that 
the Germans had managed to withdraw the 
guns only with heavy casualties. 
The Vickers' usefulness was sometimes sug-
gested by the consequences of not having any 
available, as during a 1st Battalion attack on 
the 22nd. "On the left sector, the attack fell 
down — due to no failing of the attackers. They 
went out from around the quarry into the 
impassable belt of German Machine gun fire. 
The first report of their fate came from return-
ing wounded about 8.50 pm and it was to the 
effect that the waves had been practically anni-
hilated."21 Whether or not machine gun sup-
port would have made a difference cannot be 
determined conclusively, but as the campaign 
continued into October, it was obvious that 
unsupported assaults verged on the suicidal. On 
1 October, the 22nd Battalion (after the war the 
Royal 22e Régiment) assaulted a position called 
Regina Trench. "From the time of leaving their 
trenches they were subjected to rifle and 
machine gun fire from Regina Trench and from 
their flanks. What was left of the attack — a few 
men here and there — reached Regina Trench 
and were either killed or taken prisoner."22 
One attempt to mitigate such casualties was 
to send Lewis guns forward to support the attack, 
but often this simply meant that machine gun-
ners suffered with the rest. On 16 September 
the 5th Brigade reported that machine guns 
suffered heavy casualties from enemy shelling 
throughout the day, and got no sleep or rest. 
Referring specifically to Lewis guns, the brigade 
reported that they did good work early in the 
attack but were soon put out of action by shell 
fire.23 On the 22nd, the 1st Battalion noted that 
two of its eight Lewis guns "were completely 
destroyed by shellfire."24 
There were many lessons to be learned, and 
though the staff officers and commanders of the 
First World War have long been portrayed as 
donkeys, they did attempt to determine what 
had gone wrong when attacks failed, and what 
techniques and technology were worth retain-
ing when they succeeded. Canada's 5th Brigade, 
which had begun its Somme campaign at 
Courcelette, suggested that heavy machine 
guns might have a continuing role to play in 
future assaults. Infantry officers reported that, 
on those occasions when there was little or no 
rifle fire over the ground they had to cover, it was 
often due to Canadian machine gun support. 
The latter, however, had to be well coordinated, 
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requiring good communications between them 
and the riflemen they were supposed to cover. 
Otherwise, they had to follow a set schedule, 
taking on one target and then another, and 
hope that the infantry were somehow keeping 
up. Machine gunners were becoming part of a 
system, and their value was determined in no 
small part by the personnel available to lay 
telephone lines (battlefield wireless was still in 
its infancy). Logistical considerations included, 
of course, a plentiful supply of ammunition, but 
also cooling water, and an advanced water 
pump might prove useful in that regard.25 
The infantry commented in far more detail 
on the usefulness of the Lewis gun, a logical 
development given its role in the attack and 
consolidation phases of an assault. The 5th Cana-
dian Mounted Rifles (CMR), an infantry bat-
talion in spite of its name, obviously found it 
of some use. This unit suggested it come under 
the control of company commanders, further 
decentralizing the light machine gun organi-
zation within the Canadian Corps.26 The 
2nd CMR agreed, insisting that it should "have 
Lewis Guns absolutely at disposal of Coy Com-
manders. As many as possible and pushed 
well forward."27 Even the commander of the 
8th Brigade, who had the CMRs under his con-
trol, agreed on the decentralization. Tactically, 
the 1st CMR suggested sending them ahead 
under cover of darkness to take suitable 
cover, half of them (four out of eight) to fol-
low the first wave, with the balance to be 
employed as the situation demanded. Finally, 
the 22nd Battalion, which had done well 
the first day of the battle for Courcelette, sug-
gested Lewis guns accompany the second wave, 
and that they were of sufficient importance to 
have extra men allocated to carrying their 
ammunition.28 
Battalion commanders were suggesting 
machine guns specialize according to their 
weight and firing characteristics, and that the 
Lewis be integrated into infantry companies 
while the Vickers be formed into batteries anal-
ogous to the artillery's organization. According 
to Bidwell and Graham, who have written 
extensively on British doctrine and military 
technology in the first half of the century, it was 
still too early to attempt to form anything resem-
bling a machine gun corps, "perhaps because 
its young and agressive officers were not part 
of an established social and political organi-
zation and were not noted for their tact."29 
There were changes afoot nonetheless, one of 
the more important ones for the infantry bat-
talions being the doubling of the Lewis gun 
establishment from eight to 16. This provided 
sufficient weapons to allocate one per platoon, 
though their control was centralized under 
the company commander, as so many reports 
from the Somme fighting had suggested. In 
February 1917, Canadian brigades were 
instructed to have their battalions indent for 
14 guns each, with two Colts to be replaced 
later. Thus, to give just one example, the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade reported in 
March that its 2nd Canadian Machine Gun 
Company held 16 Vickers and 36 mountings, 
while each of its battalions possessed two Colts 
and 14 Lewis guns.30 
Machine guns obviously had a role to play 
in defensive positions, and as the Canadian 
Corps moved to the base of Vimy Ridge in late-
1916/early-1917, it was suggested that the 
weapon become the linchpin of the new trench 
works. By then defences were effectively divided 
into three zones: forward observation posts to 
warn of an enemy attack and otherwise keep 
an eye on no-man's-land; a main defensive 
trench system to bring such an attack to a halt 
or from which to launch assaults of one's own; 
and reserve trenches from which counter-
attacks could be sent forward should the enemy 
succeed in capturing Canadian positions. 
Machine guns could obviously be very useful 
in the main defensive areas, but they might also 
serve further ahead, giving forward observers, 
who were necessarily few in number, increased 
fire power with which to defend themselves.31 
Lewis guns, thanks to their superior mobility, 
could be established anywhere within the sys-
tem, as demonstrated in the course of a German 
raid in early 1917, where the enemy used hand 
grenades, or bombs, to get into Canadian 
trenches. "Lance Corporal Hutt in charge of 
No 12 Post which was between 35 and 40 yards 
[32 and 36.5 m] on the right heard the bomb-
ing and immediately after, [a] party of Huns 
rushed along the top of parapet towards him, 
he opened fire with Lewis Gun and the enemy 
immediately turned about and ran back towards 
gap in wire towards their own lines."32 
As the Canadians prepared to assault the 
formidable Vimy Ridge, they carried out many 
trench raids of their own, in part to examine 
enemy defences to see what they would be 
coming up against, and also to capture prisoners 
who might provide further information con-
cerning German deployments. Machine guns 
supported many of these "minor operations" 
by firing along fixed lines to cut off the tar-
get area from immediate relief. When the 
78th Battalion made its way towards enemy 
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lines on 19 February, "All machine guns in 
the Division took part in the operation, form-
ing a defensive barrage around the raided 
area and firing on certain selected localities."33 
According to Bidwell and Graham, the Cana-
dians were innovators in the use of machine 
guns, one example being the attack against the 
ridge. We have already seen Lewis guns pushed 
foward in the assaults on the Somme while 
heavier Colts and Vickers provided support; at 
Vimy the latter were put to use in interdiction 
operations. Locking the gun into a high eleva-
tion, a stream of bullets could be sent over 
forward infantry positions and observation 
posts towards German communication trenches, 
tracks, and cross-roads, to hinder the movement 
of ammunition, food, water and personnel. On 
one occasion, for example, Colts broke up a tran-
port column moving up a road towards the 
village of Vimy, just die other side of the ridge.34 
Firing at targets one could not see was obvi-
ously very impersonal, giving the western front 
its machine-like quality; participants often 
commented on this aspect of industrial warfare, 
one being Private Donald Fraser, whom we 
met at Second Ypres. In his diary entry of 
25 February, he mentioned that "tonight I 
shot away a couple of thousand rounds of indi-
rect fire. Indirect fire is not very satisfactory — 
you cannot see your target and, of course, do 
not know what damage, if any, is done. Besides, 
the belts have to be refilled and it is a blistery 
job forcing the shells in with the palm of the 
hand without a protective covering," such as 
a thick glove.35 Barrage fire remained contro-
versial, and Worthington later noted that "there 
was still a good deal of opposition re overhead 
fire and this great volume of fire about to be 
loosed on Easter Monday was looked on in 
askance from our infantry."36 As one critic put 
it, "It is true that bullets blanketing a cross-roads 
in the rear were disconcerting, but it is doubt-
ful if they were more effective than a few well-
placed 18-pounder shells."37 
Final preparations for the assault, which 
took place on 9 April, proceeded apace in the 
weeks leading up to the attack, and included 
instructing Lewis gun crews and others on the 
mechanisms of German automatic weapons so 
the latter could be put to use if captured. Other 
training focussed on lessons learned from 
French fighting near Verdun in the last half of 
1916, the platoon having become a much more 
specialized and sophisticated unit of maneu-
ver. Each was formed of four sections, one with 
a Lewis gun, another armed with rifle grenades, 
a third with rifles, and a fourth with bombs 
(later called hand grenades), and in the months 
leading up to the battle these were put through 
their paces to learn to work together. They 
would have the support not only of artillery, but 
of 150 heavy machine guns emplaced so as to 
fire over the heads of attacking infantrymen 
during the assault, while plans were laid to 
move them forward to help consolidate any 
gains the troops might make.38 
The Germans, however, also readied their 
machine guns for an assault, the preparations 
of which the Canadians had been unable to 
camouflage completely and when it was 
launched, casualties in some sectors were heavy 
as a result. In 1st Division, the advance went 
pretty much as planned to the first objective — 
enemy artillery interfering little. "The German 
machine guns, however, were handled with 
skill and bravery. The crews appeared to be 
picked men and in all cases continued fighting 
until killed or surrounded."39 The 5th Battalion 
began its advance at 5:30 in the morning, and 
the unit reached its first objective 40 minutes 
later, but casualties amounted to over 200, or 
almost a third of those engaged, "a great many 
of which were caused by machine gun fire."40 
By 9:00 it had reached its final line for the day, 
by which time 264 of its members had become 
casualties. 
One way to counteract the destructive capa-
bilities of German automatic weapons was to 
use one's own, and the Lewis gun was rather 
prominent at Vimy Ridge, each section carry-
ing an extra 32 magazines in expectation of a 
heavy commitment.41 The doctrine that guided 
their use was simple, based on the fact that "it 
has been found that if the Lewis gun opens fire 
first [before other weapons of the platoon], the 
German machine gunner will almost invariably 
direct his attention to it, and owing to the 
apparently limited traverse of the German 
machine gun, it may then be possible for the 
other Sections to work round to either flank 
and get within the range of their particular 
weapons."42 For example, the Lewis gun sec-
tion could open fire, drawing attention to itself, 
while the rifle section gained a flank position 
from which to attack with rifle or bayonet. 
Rifle grenades could also be fired, and might be 
most effective in conjunction with the Lewis, 
which the 8th Battalion made more mobile by 
devising a sling so the gunner could carry it 
more comfortably — and hence further.43 
The battle was a success, the Canadians 
pushed the Germans off the ridge and gained 
a point of observation that allowed them to 
dominate the land beyond, though at a cost of 
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some 13 000 casualties, about 16 per cent of the 
attacking force. In the months that followed the 
machine gun element of the Corps continued 
to be put to use, though first it was necessary 
to clear away old problems, and the remaining 
Colts were ordered withdrawn only a few 
weeks after the ridge was secure.44 At about the 
same time, on 16 April 1917, the Canadian 
Machine Gun Corps was formed, an event of 
more than symbolic value, for there was now 
an official chain of command from the Vickers 
gunner in the field to brigade, division, and even 
Corps headquarters. It was an important step 
towards making the heavy machine gun the 
organizational equal of the artillery piece. 
The next opportunity for the weapons to 
prove themselves came when the Canadians 
attacked Hill 70 in August. The plan was for the 
Corps to capture the hill and force a battle of 
attrition as German counterattacks were beaten 
off. To this end, 90 000 rounds per Vickers 
were issued, though not without creating some 
transportation difficulties.45 Using the same 
tactics as at Vimy, the operation achieved its 
goals, defeating 21 counterattacks with pla-
toon weapons and heavy machine guns as well 
as artillery. Enthusiasts referred to Hill 70 as a 
"Machine Gunners Battle,"46 and they had a 
point; Corps staff officers gained enough 
confidence in automatic weapons for them to 
figure prominently in the formation's organi-
zation in the months to follow. 
A trend beginning with the issue of Lewis 
guns in late 1915 became more pronounced 
two years later — machine guns became ever 
more specialized within the Canadian Corps' 
and were organized according to such charac-
teristics as weight (and hence mobility), range 
and rate of fire. The Lewis, which could be car-
ried by one man (though perhaps with some 
difficulty over rough ground), was definitely 
established as a platoon weapon (Fig. 4). The 
Vickers, heavier but with the necessary mech-
anism and range to fire indirectly at distant 
enemy positions and communications nodes, 
answered to ever higher levels in the chain 
of command, until, in September 1917, com-
panies were detached from infantry brigades 
and formed into divisional machine gun 
battalions. 
Of course, not everyone agreed on the 
proper use of the heavy machine gun. One 
who insisted on the utility of indirect fire — 
hence giving the Vickers a doctrinal place of its 
own between infantry and artillery — was 
Raymond Brutinel. Born in France, he was an 
officer in the French Army before emigrating 
to Canada in 1905; at the outbreak of war, he 
joined the Canadian Militia and organized the 
Automobile Machine Gun Brigade. He went 
Fig. 4 
Platoon tactics. Note the 
man on the left in the 
second wave, prepared 
to fire his Lewis gun from 
the hip. (Courtesy 
National Archives of 
Canada. PA4773) 
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overseas as a lieutenant-colonel in 1914, con-
tinuing to be active in machine gun units and 
proposing their greater autonomy. Many dis-
agreed with his views; the commander of 
2nd Infantry Brigade, F. W. O. Loomis, stated 
emphatically that "The Machine Gun is an 
Infantry weapon, and its employment in war-
fare cannot be separated from the Infantry with 
success. Machine Guns cannot be handled in 
the fight by a formation higher than the 
Battalion, successfully." He went on to sug-
gest that laying on a barrage was not the 
weapon's normal function, though it might 
prove useful in that role on occasion. "Every 
machine gunner should be an Infantryman. 
A Rifleman first and a Machine Gunner sec-
ond."47 After more than three years of warfare, 
the proper function of the heavier automatic 
weapons was still the subject of debate. 
Doubts in the minds of infantry brigade 
commanders did not prevent machine gun-
ners from preparing for a wide range of roles 
as the Corps got ready for its attack on the 
ridge near Passchendaele. The British had first 
launched the offensive on 31 July 1917, and had 
known success and failure (perhaps too much 
of the latter), both demanding a heavy price in 
blood. As casualties mounted, divisions were 
rotated through the mud, and the Canadian 
Corps' turn came in October, after its com-
mander, Sir Arthur Currie, had demanded 
sufficient time to prepare. The Corps carried out 
a series of assaults on 26 and 30 October and 
on 6 and 10 November, which finally crested 
the ridge, at a cost of some 16 000 dead, 
wounded, missing or captured. 
Only a month before, heavy machine guns 
had been reorganized into larger units, of 
64 crews each, and for one of the attacks the 
2nd Division's machine gun battalion ordered 
40 guns, or five batteries, set up for barrages in 
support of the infantry's advance. To avoid los-
ing too many gunners to hostile artillery, they 
moved into the line only 24 hours before an 
assault, and were withdrawn about two days 
later. In the 1st Division, the 1st Brigade alone 
was alloted 44 Vickers to cover its assault; 32 
for the supporting barrage, eight to follow the 
infantry and repel German counterattacks, and 
four for sniping (that is to say, to engage specific 
targets with direct fire).48 
Quite clearly, there was no way to guaran-
tee, regardless of the amount of artillery and 
machine gun support available, that deter-
mined enemy troops could be forced to remain 
in their shelters until an advance overran them, 
and German machine gunners proved especially 
effective at Passchendaele. As the 46th Battalion 
reported after the 26 October assault, "The 
attack was carried out most excellently by this 
Battalion, all objectives being quickly gained 
against very severe opposition and heavy 
machine gun fire. Severe casualties were caused 
this Battalion by the MG fire experienced 70% 
of the attacking force becoming casualties,"49 
hence the need for machine gun crews to help 
defend hard-won positions; the 12th Brigade 
reported that five of six crews sent forward 
with the advance brought their weapons into 
operation.50 
Lewis guns were called upon to carry out a 
wide variety of roles. In the course of assem-
bling an attacking force, for example, observa-
tion posts were pushed out into no-man's-land, 
to within 40 yards of enemy lines if possible, 
and manned with a Lewis-gun crew and infantry 
whose task it was to protect the assembly area. 
In the attack itself, a Lewis team continued to 
form one of four sections within a platoon, 
though maneuvers held in September had 
determined that the section commander 
required a certain amount of independence, 
since he was in the best position to determine 
how to carry out an assigned task.51 With such 
autonomy, the team still faced serious diffi-
culties, especially in the legendary mud of 
Passchendaele. As Leon Wolff described the 
situation before the Canadians arrived: "The 
Lewis gunners slipped and fell and swore, and 
their heavy, clumsy weapons often became 
choked with mud."52 
Some managed to rise above the obstacles 
set in their path and complete their missions. 
One innovation the Germans had adopted at 
Passchendaele was to build pillboxes to protect 
their heavy machine guns, but the Canadians 
had been rehearsing platoon tactics to deal 
with these and so managed a modicum of suc-
cess against them. The Lewis gun played a 
role, keeping a strong point or pillbox under 
heavy fire so it could be enveloped around the 
flanks by infantry firing rifles and lobbing 
grenades. "As soon as our men closed in, they 
surrendered immediately or were wiped out,"53 
one officer reported, and another noted that 
"Lewis Guns were most effective and were 
kept in action till the last."54 
One way to boost a battalion's fire-power, first 
adopted on a large scale at Vimy Ridge, was to 
capture enemy machine guns, which one report 
noted "were supplied with ammunition and 
were kept in action in our positions."55 In some 
areas the technique proved particularly effec-
tive, the 12th Brigade related that "Both 
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72nd and 78th Battus were successful in bring-
ing into action early in the operation, captured 
German machine guns, and the value of the 
training which had been given men in the 
operation of enemy guns was most apparent."56 
Such education must have been comprehen-
sive, for not only was it necessary to learn how 
to operate enemy weapons, but since these 
were sited to take on attacking Canadian troops, 
they had to be removed from their set positions 
and placed, facing the opposite direction, to 
help repel inevitable counterattacks. It was 
something of a race between Canadian sol-
diers attempting to get enemy equipment into 
action and German troops trying to force them 
out of their newly won positions. 
In the end, it was the Canadians who held the 
top of the ridge and the village of Passchendaele, 
and it was again time to evaluate the equipment, 
tactics, and training of the Canadian Corps to 
determine what worked, what did not, and 
what could be improved. The Vickers crews had 
suffered: 
more severely than anticipated. This is 
explained by the fact that under the present 
conditions of warfare Machine Gun Compa-
nies must work in more advanced positions, 
and often without cover. Also, there is no 
doubt whatever, that the system of area shoots 
carried out by the enemy, and which are very 
largely directed against Machine gun Com-
panies, has caused a very large number of 
casualties.57 
One way to mitigate such losses was to hold 
back, with gunners moving forward only far 
enough to get clear of the enemy's shelling of 
no-man's-land, "from this point they should 
advance by bounds to positions which have 
been reconnoitred by the section comman-
der."58 The difficulties of the task were exem-
plified by Lieutenant Hugh Mackenzie, CMGC, 
who won the Victoria Cross for holding a spur 
against German counterattacks for eight hours. 
As one witness reported: "he was a god-
send. .. .He didn't belong to us, he had no busi-
ness — to be in the front line. The front line 
accidentally happened where he was."59 As 
for the Lewis guns, perhaps their utility could 
be determined by the demands placed upon 
them, and while the average rifleman at 
Passchendaele fired 70 rounds of ammunition, 
or about a third of his normal load, in the 
course of an attack, the average Lewis gunner 
went through 25 full magazines.60 
After the mud-splattered Passchendaele 
campaign wound down, the Canadians returned 
to their trenches and billets in the Vimy sector. 
Vickers gunners took up defensive positions, 
as did Lewis teams, though the latter also prac-
tised die platoon tactics diat had shown some 
success in 1917. In March 1918, automatic 
weapons gained greater autonomy and divi-
sional machine gun battalions became separate 
units within the Canadian Machine Gun Corps. 
Developments elsewhere favoured the CMGC, 
for while the British were dealing with infantry 
shortages by reducing their brigades from four 
to three battalions, Currie not only insisted on 
retaining the larger structure, but increased 
the machine gun establishment so there were 
enough gunners and crews to handle 96 Vickers 
per division (organized into 16-gun batteries), 
compared with 64 in British formations. The 
fact that the Canadians were asked to take 
responsibility for more frontage also favoured 
the expansion of the machine gun arm,61 and 
Canada's 5th Division, still training in England, 
was broken up to allow such changes. 
Brutinel had won out over those who saw 
heavy machine guns as exclusively infantry 
weapons and he himself took over command 
of the new branch. 
The machine-gun service was to be regarded 
as a distinctive arm, intermediate between 
the infantry and the artillery, and with tactics 
of its own. Though there were occasions when 
MG companies or batteries might be tem-
porarily attached to infantry brigades or bat-
talions for duty, machine-gun battalions were 
divisional troops under the command and 
tactical control of a Divisional Machine Gun 
Commander, whose position was closely 
analogous to that of the CRA [Chief Royal 
Artillery] of a Division with respect to artillery.62 
Brutinel's success was due to his ability to 
convince Currie of the justice of his cause; die 
Corps commander insisted that he would 
"proceed immediately with the organization, 
if I can obtain the guns. Official sanction can 
come later."63 The specialization of automatic 
weapons according to characteristics such as 
weight and mechanism was complete; the 
Vickers was gathered into an arm of its own 
while the Lewis was closely integrated into 
the structure, training and tactics of the infantry 
platoon. With the number of Lewis guns dou-
bling in the early months of 1918, further 
changes were made to the infantry platoon, 
formed of two rifle sections and two light 
machine gun sections.64 The machine gunner, 
whether heavy or light, had most definitely 
come into his own. 
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In the winter of 1917-18, the raiding and 
counter-raiding that had characterized static 
warfare a year previously resumed, with the odd 
German success often blamed on the mechan-
ical breakdown of Lewis guns, now considered 
essential in defence. There was little time to 
belabour such issues, however, since the Germans 
launched the first of a series of offensives on 
21 March in the hopes of ending the war before 
the Americans, who had declared war a year 
before, could bring their full weight to bear. The 
Canadians on Vimy Ridge were left untouched, 
except for the odd raid, and so had the luxury 
of learning from what was happening on the 
British and French fronts. The enemy relied 
heavily on machine guns in these assaults, 
with some 350 heavy and medium automatic 
weapons per division65 for "facilitating the 
approach of the groups to the enemy's position 
by keeping the latter under fire."66 As for 
more portable automatic weapons, "The light 
machine gun and the rifleman formed the 
infantry group, which had to hang together in 
trouble and danger and the life-and-death 
struggle. Its fire-power was further increased 
by quick-firing weapons and all kinds and 
various sorts of rifle grenades."67 Their tactics 
were very similar to those of other protago-
nists on the western front, including the Cana-
dian Corps, which saw its own developments 
vindicated in German successes — temporary 
as the latter might prove. 
On 18 July, French, American and African 
forces launched a counter-offensive that brought 
the Germans to a halt and began to roll them 
back. By this time the enemy, who had kept the 
Allies to limited and bloody gains in 1916 with 
some 11 000 machine guns, had built up a 
force of 32 000 heavies (Maxims) and 37 000 
lights (Bergmanns), but something had changed 
in two years, for no fewer than 29 000 automatic 
weapons were captured by the British alone in 
the summer and fall of 1918. The machine gun, 
which Tom Wintringham claimed "locked" 
the front in 1914, could no longer do so, as 
"Tactics and technology had caught up with 
them...accurate artillery fire crushed them; 
concentrated British machine-gun and Lewis 
gun fire neutralized them and sometimes tanks 
rolled over them."68 Automatic weapons were 
more weapons of offense than defence in the 
last eight months of the war. 
Having planned an offensive in the area of 
Amiens before the Germans had even begun 
their spring and summer campaigns, once the 
Germans had been turned back, the British set 
out to begin moving forward again, in what 
came to be known as the Hundred Days. In the 
following battles machine guns would play an 
important role, though not necessarily due to 
their technical or tactical characteristics. As a 
letter from the Canadian Corps to its repre-
sentative at Britain's General Headquarters 
explained in the midst of the campaign: "As the 
question of manpower becomes more acute, the 
desirability of getting the maximum of fire 
power from the minimum number of men must 
be appreciated. To do this we must increase the 
number of light machine guns or automatic 
rifles."69 For this and other reasons, Corps staff 
officers concluded that "the experience gained 
in the fighting this year provefs] that the whole 
structure of attack or defence is built up around 
the machine gun."70 
If this was the case, training those who 
would handle automatic weapons would be 
crucial, and Lewis gunners were expected to 
be able to change a magazine in five seconds 
or less, load bullets into a magazine by hand 
in less than two minutes, be able to get five out 
of six rounds into a 6-inch (15-cm) circle at 
30 yards (27.5 m), and have a detailed knowl-
edge of the mechanism so as to effect minor 
repairs. With ever more faith being placed in 
such technicians, ammunition expenditures 
were prodigious, and for the Lewis gun alone, 
the battalion quartermaster was expected 
to hold 160 magazines (7 520 rounds) and 
eight more boxes (9 984 rounds) for a total of 
2 184 per gun to cany out a single attack. Trans-
porting such necessities was a major challenge, 
and involved mules, wagons, and lorries — 
and sometimes even tanks — to move up 
ammunition.71 
In battle, it was often a case of machine gun 
against machine gun, and at Amiens, where the 
offensive was launched on 8 August, the 
5th Battalion reported that "The opposition 
encountered, apart from the enemy barrage, 
which was very severe on the left sector of the 
Brigade Front, consisted mostly of Machine 
Guns."72 The Canadians' success against such 
defences required their own automatic weapons 
to carry out "fairly intricate manoeuvres in 
open country, but they took out the opposing 
machine-gun nests with rifle grenades, bombs, 
and Lewis guns just as they had practised doing 
during their summer's training,"73 hence prov-
ing the utility of platoon tactics similar to 
those used at Vimy and Passchendaele. The 
1st Battalion, however, had to point out that 
"as usual, personnel of the Crews suffered 
heavy casualties."74 After a month of fighting, 
staff officers noted that "Machine Gun Nests 
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cannot be rushed. Troops must learn to be 
patient — and know when to stop as well as 
when to advance."75 
Vickers teams followed to help consolidate 
gains, or supported the assault with fire; the 
3rd Company of the CMGC's 1st Battalion fired 
over the heads of infantrymen as the latter 
attacked up a slope.76 Many went even fur-
ther than that, actually accompanying the 
attacking battalions. The 3rd Brigade reported 
that "These batteries advanced with the 
Infantry, and had a certain amount of close 
fighting in the mist. Targets of opportunity 
were taken on and observed fire directed, and 
they quickly took up defensive positions to 
assist the defence of the Green Line,"77 one of 
the intermediate objectives. At Canal-du-
Nord, on 27 September, the 7th Battalion was 
almost gleeful over the help the machine 
gunners had provided, relating that "Four guns 
of 'G' Battery, 1st Canadian Machine Gun 
Battalion under Lieut Balfe, did splendid 
work in assisting the Battalion to overcome 
the resistance on the Green Line. They 
moved forward with the Front Lines of 
Infantry and by engaging enemy machine 
guns and giving covering fire, rendered 
invaluable assistance."78 
There was little doubt that machine guns, 
whether heavy or light, were important assets 
when used in direct support, but the contro-
versy continued to rage over the use of the 
Vickers in an indirect role. During the assault 
on the Drocourt-Quéant Line of 2 September, 
artillery was held back because Brutinel insisted 
his guns were able to protect the attack, but 
many German batteries remained in action, 
creating a vicious unopposed fire. After the 
last set-piece attack of the Canadian Corps, at 
Valenciennes on 1 and 2 November, Brigadier-
General A. G. L. McNaughton, commander of 
the Corp's heavy artillery, ordered a survey of 
enemy-dead to determine what had killed 
them; Brutinel claimed that machine gun fire 
had been mainly responsible. The study's con-
clusions are no longer extant, but McNaughton 
also requested that intelligence personnel inter-
view prisoners-of-war, and those of the counter-
attacking battalions were near-unanimous that 
artillery, and not machine guns, had broken 
their assaults.79 
Such evidence is not necessarily conclu-
sive, but what is clear is that the role of the 
machine gunner changed dramatically from 
1914 to 1918. At the beginning of the war the 
Canadian contingent simply had too few auto-
matic weapons for them to play any important 
part in either defensive or offensive tactics, 
and what they did have — the Colt — proved 
unreliable. By the Hundred Days, the situa-
tion was much different; members of machine 
gun units had expanded from 350 all ranks to 
8 364. If casualties are any measure of abranch's 
role on the battlefield, it is worth noting that 
the CMGC lost 2 339 men from August to 
October 1918, compared with 1 881 in artillery 
batteries — an indication of the machine gun-
ners' closer physical involvement with the 
infantry battle. As for Lewis gunners, they were 
an integral part of the platoon, and made up 
almost half its strength and no doubt their 
casualties were comparable to those of rifle-
men. In both cases, though their training was 
very much that of the technician, they were 
definitely still soldiers — and suffered 
accordingly. 
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